Class, Policy Attitudes and U.S. Presidential Voting in the Post-Industrial Era: The Importance of Issue Salience

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Abstract

In the Post-industrial Era there has been an apparent weakening of the relationship between class and voting in the U.S., with lower class voters becoming less likely to support the Democratic Party. We argue that this reflects that lower class status predicts liberal economic attitudes, but conservative views on cultural and racial issues, while the parties are consistently liberal or conservative, creating conflicts for many voters. How do voters settle such internal conflicts? We argue that the salience voters attach to these different types of issues determines how policy attitudes, and indirectly class, shapes voting. Using ANES and GSS data since the 1970s, we find that class consistently predicts economic and cultural/minority policy attitudes, and that lower class voters who place more salience on economic issues, and upper class voters for whom cultural issues are more salient, are more likely to support the Democratic Party in presidential elections.

Keywords: class; redistribution; voting; public opinion; political behavior

Word count: 9,797

Introduction

During the Industrial Era in the West lower class individuals generally supported egalitarian economic policies and left parties, while upper class individuals typically preferred less redistribution and conservative parties (Korpi 1980). As deindustrialization has occurred working class voters have become less likely to support left and center-left parties, such as the Democratic Party in the U.S. (Carnes and Lupu 2020; Evans and Tilley 2012). Has class become irrelevant to policy attitudes and voting in the U.S.?

Understanding whether and how class remains relevant for these outcomes is important. Many scholars argue that class receded in importance as industrial class groups declined as material facts (Clark and Lipset 1991; Pakulski and Waters 1996), and post-material issues become more prominent (Berry et al. 1998). Though deindustrialization has disrupted economic categories, and cultural and minority rights issues feature more prominently, the U.S.' growing economic inequality (Franko and Witko 2017) and stagnant social mobility (Chetty et al. 2014) lead us to believe that class remains important for policy attitudes, and even voting, albeit in a more complicated manner than during the Industrial Era.

Specifically, we argue that class predicts egalitarian/liberal or inegalitarian/conservative policy attitudes on both economic and what we call the "cultural/minority" policy dimension. Because the Democratic Party is willing to use government to pursue egalitarian or liberal outcomes on both dimensions and the opposite is true for the Republican Party, liberal policy attitudes on either dimension predict support for the Democratic party. However, lower class voters often have liberal economic but conservative minority/cultural policy preferences, while the opposite is true for upper class voters, meaning they are often conflicted. How do voters negotiate these conflicts? We argue that the salience that voters attach to these different policy dimensions helps determine how they vote, and thus indirectly determines how class shapes voting.

Using both American National Election Studies (ANES) and General Social Survey

(GSS) data from the 1970s to 2018 we find support for these arguments. Specifically, class consistently predicts egalitarian/liberal or inegalitarian/conservative attitudes toward redistribution and minority/cultural policy, which in turn consistently predict Democratic presidential voting. Due to frequent conflict in attitudes on these two dimensions, class is only weakly associated with voting, but egalitarian economic policy preferences more strongly predict support for Democratic voting when economic issues are more salient to individual voters. The same is true of cultural policy attitudes. These findings can explain how class still remains very important for policy attitudes and for understanding U.S. mass politics, but is nevertheless only weakly related to voting patterns in many elections.

The Continuing Relevance of Class for Policy Attitudes and Voting

For a variety of reasons, class has never been as central to politics in the U.S. as it in other Western democracies, but class politics in a muted form emerged by the 1930s (Witko 2017). During the New Deal to Great Society eras, the U.S. demonstrated the typical Industrial Era cleavage found in Western democracies – lower class individuals disproportionately supported the left-leaning Democratic Party and upper class voters disproportionately supported Republican candidates (Brewer and Stonecash 2006; Brooks and Manza 1997; Stonecash et al. 2000; Witko 2016).

Western nations have shifted from industrial to post-industrial economies in recent decades (Iversen and Cusack 2000). These economic changes reduced the size of industrial class groups, created new economic groups (Clark and Lipset 1991; Kitschelt and Rehm 2019) and coincided with a change in the policy agenda from a focus on redistribution and material issues to a greater emphasis on self-expression, lifestyle issues, i.e. "post-material issues." (Evans and Tilley 2012; Inglehart 2008; Jones, Theriault and Whyman 2019). The Democratic Party has focused more on post-material issues in recent decades

(Berry 1999), and the Republican Party has increasingly embraced "culture war" and racial/ethnic wedge issues (Hacker and Pierson 2020). What do these changes mean for how class shapes policy attitudes and voting?

Though traditional industrial class groups have declined, it is clear that an economic hierarchy remains in the United States, arguably even strengthening in some ways (Chetty et al. 2014; Franko and Witko 2017). It would thus be surprising if class were not still relevant for redistributive policy attitudes. Indeed, a number of recent studies show that lower class voters are more supportive of taxing, spending and other programs to equalize economic opportunity and outcomes in the U.S. (Bartels 2008; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2018; Franko, Tolbert and Witko 2013; Gilens 2012; McCall and Manza 2001; Piston 2018).

However, in the Post-Industrial Era we must also consider cultural and minority rights policies (Spies 2013). Initially, it may seem that class would not be relevant to, say, LGBTQ rights. However, research shows that upper class Americans are more likely to have liberal social policy attitudes (Gelman and Cortina 2008). Class-based differences in financial resources, higher education and workplace environments can develop into different worldviews (Bourdieu and Richardson 1986; De Keere 2018). Kitschelt and Rehm (2019) have a great discussion of education as a driver of attitudes on these types of issues and education is a key component of many measures of class (Carnes and Lupu 2020). Stubager (2010) shows that the highly educated are more tolerant of outgroups and have more libertarian social preferences than others, perhaps because highly educated people are more likely to be familiar with the historical oppression that many minority groups have suffered.

Other aspects of class may also affect attitudes. For instance, if resistance to equality for different groups results from economic precarity lower income individuals will be less tolerant (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). Occupation can also shape attitudes due to different experiences with hierarchy and messages about gender equality (Kohn and Schooler 1969; Sayman 2007). Professionals, managers and investors may also be more

aware of the ways that discriminatory policies actually have the potential to threaten their investments (Grose and Peterson 2020).

Though there are certainly other ways to describe these "second dimension" attitudes (Kitschelt and Rehm 2019; Stubager 2010), for simplicity we refer to egalitarian cultural and minority rights attitudes as liberal and inegalitarian attitudes as conservative. We prefer not to use the term post-material because these matters have critical material implications. We do not use the term libertarian because many people who have liberal attitudes on these dimensions want that the government take active steps to reduce inequities.

Of course, not all upper or lower class individuals share the same policy preferences. Gelman and Cortina (2008) show that upper income people in conservative states have more conservative attitudes on social issues than upper income people in liberal states. Yet, they also show that in all states the wealthy have more liberal social policy attitudes than the poor and the wealthy have more conservative economic attitudes. Thus, overall, we expect that higher class individuals will have more egalitarian or liberal cultural and minority rights attitudes and more conservative economic policy attitudes.

Much of the research and popular commentary about how class shapes attitudes and behavior has focused on the white working class (Bartels 2006; Carnes and Lupu 2020; Frank 2005; Kitschelt and Rehm 2019). Yet, the working class is only one class group and, like the rest of the U.S. population, it is increasingly non-white (Wilson and Maume 2016). It almost goes without saying that minority groups will have different attitudes toward policies affecting the equal status of minorities. There is also reason to expect that class may work differently regarding economic attitudes among some minority groups. Race and class intersect in the U.S. because Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be lower or working class, and class is racialized to some degree Michener (2017). Furthermore, a strong sense of shared fate among wealthy and poorer African Americans (Dawson 2003), might lead African Americans to have liberal economic policy preferences regardless of income, and a similar dynamic appears to exist for Latinos Rhodes, Schaffner

and McElwee (2017). We account for these differences in our models by separating whites from non-whites, though unfortunately data limitations prevent us from looking at Blacks, Hispanics and others separately.

How do these policy attitudes affect voting? Though much has been made of the abandonment of the Democratic Party by the white working class, there is some dispute over its extent and timing. Bartels (2006) and Stonecash et al. (2000) find that, outside the South, through the late 1990s working class voters may have become even *more* Democratic in voting. Others argue that class is of declining relevance (Abramowitz and Teixeira 2009) but as late as 2008 the majority of the white working class supported the Democratic presidential nominee (Carnes and Lupu 2020).

Do these changes in class-based voting reflect an abandonment of liberal redistributive policy preferences? We referenced several studies showing that lower class status has remained a strong predictor of liberal economic policy attitudes, and because the Democratic Party tends to hold more liberal economic policy stances it should attract more support from these voters. It also appears, however, that more liberal attitudes on second dimension issues predict support for the Democratic Party (Carmines and Layman 1997; Kitschelt and Rehm 2019), and as noted lower class voters have more conservative second dimension attitudes.

The Democratic Party is consistently liberal and the Republican Party is consistently conservative, while class groups are inconsistent, so many upper and lower class voters are conflicted in their support for the two parties. Under these conditions of conflicting attitudes, we think that the salience of economic and cultural/minority policy issues help individuals decide which party to support. Issue salience, or how prominent a given issue is for a voter (Bartle and Laycock 2012), has long been associated with vote choice and can interact with policy attitudes to shape vote choice (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Dennison 2020; RePass 1971).

The salience of particular issues can vary across elections as a result of elite strategies or individually due to strongly held beliefs. Research focused on Europe makes a strong

case that the working class abandonment of left parties reflects their relative abandonoment of economic issues and the emergence of new parties focused more on cultural issues (Rennwald and Evans 2014). If parties make cultural issues the centerpiece of their election campaigns, then voters will be more likely to vote on the basis of these issues (Spies 2013). Yet, perhaps to an unusual degree in the U.S., it is also the case that many voters prioritize cultural issues (e.g. abortion) and racial issues.

Whether as a result of elite strategies or mass processes, we expect that individuals who view economic/redistributive issues as more salient will place more weight on their economic policy preferences when voting, leading lower class voters to favor the Democratic Party more, and upper class voters the Republican Party. When cultural and racial issues are more salient, upper class individuals who hold more egalitarian attitudes will be more likely to support the Democratic Party, and vice versa. In other words, individuals will be more likely to vote along the lines of industrial class groups when economic issues are more salient.

To summarize our expectations, we anticipate that since the 1970s, class will be a weak and inconsistent predictor of Democratic presidential voting. However, higher class status will be consistently negatively associated with economic policy liberalism and consistently positively associated with cultural/minority policy liberalism. Finally, how these policy attitudes, and thus class, are associated with voting for Democratic Presidential candidates will depend, in part, on whether the economic or cultural/minority dimension is more salient to individual voters.

Analyzing the Relationship between Class, Policy Preferences and Presidential Voting

Data

We begin by examining the relationship between class and voting, and then turn to the relationship between class and policy attitudes. We then assess the relationship between policy attitudes and voting, and how it varies depending on the salience of the various policy dimensions to voters. For all models we rely on data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 1977 to 2018 and the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1972 to 2016. These surveys provide us with nationally representative samples of American adults over decades and allow us to consistently measure our central concepts.[1]

Measures

Specifics on all variables we use from the GSS and ANES, including descriptive statistics, can be found in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. Measuring class is critical for our study, yet this task is not entirely straightforward. Class is a complex construct and different measures of class tap into somewhat different underlying characteristics. McCall and Manza (2001) write that there are four measures of class: subjective, occupation, education and income-based approaches. Each of these measures varies in terms of what information is used and each may have a somewhat different association with our outcome variables as a result. To ensure that our results are not dependent on one measurement approach we examine the four most widely used measures of class: subjective identification, occupation, education and income.

[1]The years included in our analyses are based on the availability of the survey questions of interest. For both sources, data are available in even years, although the GSS did field surveys every year from 1972 to 1978, from 1986 to 1991, and in 1993. The question we use to measure subjective class was not asked by the ANES in 1986, 1996, 1998, and 2002. Discussed in more detail below, the ANES also does not provide respondent occupation data for some years, which prevents us from using our occupation-based measure of class in those years. The response rates for the surveys used in our analyses can be found in Appendix Table A1.

The idea that one's subjective self-identification as a member of a particular class is a critical determinant of preferences is consistent with Marxist thought and supported by recent research into class identity (Jakopovich 2014; McCall and Manza 2001; Sosnaud, Brady and Frenk 2013). For *subjective class* the GSS asks respondents if they see themselves belonging to "the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class," where higher values indicate higher class. The ANES version of subjective class asks respondents if they think of themselves as belonging to a particular social class, but is designed as a multi-part question. Therefore, the variable can take on eight potential values where, again, higher values are associated with a higher class.

Obviously, people may subjectively identify with something other than their objective class and it is thus useful to know how objective class is associated with our outcomes. Income is a common objective way to measure social class (McCall and Manza 2001; Sosnaud, Brady and Frenk 2013), often employed in political science research (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Kelly and Witko 2012). This measure may be particularly sensible in the U.S. with its less rigid class hierarchy and limited class consciousness (Kelly and Witko 2012). Income group is also often meaningful for tax, welfare and social insurance policies. To maintain consistency over time and between surveys, *income* is measured using five categories that approximate income quintiles on a year-to-year basis.

Education is also used as a measure of social class (Bartels 2006; Carnes and Lupu 2020; Gilens 2009). Education is in some ways a very parsimonious measure of class because it is correlated with income and occupation. However, the substance of college curricula and networking at some colleges may have direct effects on many preferences aside from class status achieved from education (Davis 1982; Mendelberg, McCabe and Thal 2017; Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007), and not all highly educated people have high earnings. For respondent *education*, the GSS asks about the highest year of school completed while the ANES asks for the highest degree earned. In both cases we measure education using five categories where higher values indicate higher educational attainment.

Occupation-based measures are often employed by sociologists (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006; Goldthorpe 2000). Occupation is perhaps the most direct measure of someone's location in the means of production. Yet, occupation measures may cause us to conflate class position with other workplace experiences.[2] Perhaps the most well-known measure is from Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979), hereafter EGP. Our *occupation-based* class measure is based on updates to the EGP scheme by Morgan (2017), and the five class groups we created for both surveys are presented in Table 1 along with general descriptions and example occupations of each class.[3] The five occupation-based class categories are meant to be descriptive of the general types of occupations included in each group and are not intended to indicate an ordered ranking (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Morgan 2017). Accordingly, we include a series of dummy variables for each class grouping – with "working class" as the reference category.[4]

Our approach is not to argue for any one measure of class being superior, but to simply acknowledge the complexity of measuring class and be transparent that the different measures might produce somewhat different results. Though there are certainly correlations among the three objective class measure – see Figure B1 in the Appendix – there is considerable variation in income and education within each of the occupation groups.[5] Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that income is conceptually different from the other measures of class in that it is based on the collective attributes of the family (i.e., measured as total family income) rather than being an individual characteristic.

The variable *Democratic vote* measures vote choice in the presidential election from the GSS and ANES, both of which are coded 1 for those who choose the Democratic Party candidate and 0 for those voting Republican. The GSS and ANES both ask for

[2]For instance, Hertel-Fernandez (2018) shows that workers are frequently exposed to propaganda in some workplaces, and this can shape their preferences and attitudes.

[3]Additional details about the EGP measure can be found in Appendix B, including how we arrived at our five-class version based on Morgan's more elaborate categorizations. See Morgan (2017) for a thorough explanation of categorizing occupations into the EGP groups. Because the data on occupation differs between the GSS and ANES, the Appendix also includes a reliability analysis comparing the EGP measurement approaches we use for the two surveys.

[4]An overview of missing value patterns for all of our class measures can be found in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.

[5]Appendix Tables A6 and A7 give the Spearman's rank correlation coefficients.

Table 1: EGP Social Class Categories and Occupation Descriptions

EGP label	Description	Occupation examples
Upper Class	Higher-grade professionals, administrators, managers, and officials	Chief executives, financial analysts, architects, lawyers, physicians, human resources managers, financial advisors, computer programmers
Upper Middle Class	Higher-grade routine non-manual and service employees	Tax preparers, travel agents, sales representatives, office and administrative support workers
Middle-Class Service	Lower-grade routine non-manual and service employees	Waiters and waitresses, barbers, cashiers, childcare workers, bus drivers
Middle-Class Manual	Higher-grade technicians and repairers, public safety workers, performers, and supervisors of manual workers	Construction managers, dental hygienists, firefighters, police officers
Working Class	Manual workers, lower-grade technicians, installers, and repairers	Carpenters, electricians, home appliance repairers, dishwashers, roofers, metal workers, taxi drivers

Note: Class categories and descriptions are based on Morgan's (2017) social class coding methodological report, which is an update of the original Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979) social class measure. We combine some original class categories that included relatively few respondents to make our analyses more manageable, which is discussed in the Appendix. See Morgan (2017) for full details on the EGP classification schema.

the respondents' self-reported presidential vote choice following each election. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election, in either the following year or two years after the election.[6]

To measure economic/redistributive policy attitudes we use a GSS question asking if the *government should reduce inequality* ("reduce the income differences between rich and the poor"). The original responses range from 1 to 7 with higher values representing

[6]Although the GSS asks about candidate choice in 1972 (about the 1968 election) and 1973 (about the 1972 election), we do not consider these responses because other covariates are not available. The complete list of years when the vote choice question was asked by the GSS and used in our analysis is provided in Appendix Table A2.

greater support for redistribution. We rescale the variable to a 0 to 1 scale so that it is consistent with our vote choice dependent variables. From the ANES we use the variable *guaranteed jobs and income* (should the government make sure that "every person has a job and a good standard of living"). The original responses also range from 1 to 7 with higher values indicating more support for government intervention, and we also rescale to a 0 to 1 scale.

Because the GSS and ANES both regularly ask about opinions on abortion and LGBTQ rights over several decades, and because of their prominence in U.S. politics, we use questions regularly asked on these two topics to create our measure of *culture policy* attitudes. Using the GSS we create an index that combines seven questions about abortion and four about LGBTQ rights (all equally weighted) and is then scaled to take on values between 0 and 1. One question about abortion and one regarding LGBTQ issues are combined (equally weighted) to create the ANES culture policy index, which is also rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale. For both culture indices higher values indicate more liberal stances on abortion and LGBTQ rights. Details on question wording can be found in Appendix C.

Our measures of *race policy* attitudes uses questions about racial/minority issues asked regularly over time. For the GSS, we combine the answers to two questions (each equally weighted) on improving the living standards of Black Americans in response to past discrimination and using government spending to improve the conditions of Blacks. The index is rescaled to range from 0 to 1. The ANES only asks one question about race-related policy consistently over time, asking respondents whether they believe government should improve the social and economic position of Black Americans and other minorities. This variable is also rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Both race policy measures are coded so that higher values indicate more liberal views. Further details can be found in Appendix C. While these questions clearly tap into attitudes toward Blacks, they also likely reflect redistributive attitudes to some extent. This underscores, as we note above, that questions about equality for different social groups certainly contains an important

material element.

To create salience measures we rely on open-ended questions in the ANES that ask respondents about anything they like or dislike about the presidential candidates and their respective parties (equivalent questions are not available in the GSS). Based on these questions we create a *redistribution issue salience* indicator that is equal to 1 for those who mention issues related to redistribution and 0 otherwise; a similar *culture issue salience* indicator for those who mention abortion and/or LGBTQ rights; and a *race issue salience* indicator for those who mention issues related to improving the positions of Black Americans. See Appendix C for a more details on these measures and for the exact terms used to determine whether respondents viewed a given issue as being salient.

Our approach to measuring issue salience is similar to those used in other studies (Abramowitz 1995; Layman and Carmines 1997) and is appropriate for several reasons given the context of our research. First, these are open-ended questions that respondents may answer with any number of candidate or party attributes (honesty, experience, issue positions, etc.). If respondents, unprompted to think about issues let alone particular issues, answer about a particular issue that is clear evidence that this issue is important (i.e., salient) to them. Second, because responses are not restricted by close-ended questions, we can more easily categorize the answers to correspond with respondents' redistributive, cultural, and race-based policy preferences. Finally, the open-ended questions are available for most years we have data on policy preferences and vote choice.[7] As noted above, issue salience can reflect elite strategies or individual predispositions, but for our analysis this distinction is not important, since either type of issue salience can be expected to have the same result for the relationship between class and voting.[8]

We also control for a number of factors that may shape policy preferences and voting: party identification (7 point), political ideology (7 point), age, sex, racial identity, and

[7]Responses to like/dislike questions are not available for the 2008, 2012, and 2016 surveys so we are unable to create the salience measures in these years.

[8]It is possible for some voters that they choose a candidate or party, and then determine which issues are salient on the basis of that prior choice. However, even here, because all candidates and parties have policy positions on various dimensions, there must be something about the underlying voter or campaign that caused them to highlight one particular dimension over another.

whether the respondent lives in the South, since class politics arguably developed on a different trajectory there (Manza and Brooks 1999). As described below, some of our analyses focus on subsamples by racial identity to account for potential differences in the role of class among white and minority groups. To make these analyses feasible, we rely on a basic measure of race that simply accounts for white and nonwhite respondents.

Modeling Approach

First, we examine whether our class measures are associated with Democratic vote choice. Then, we turn to an analysis of whether the association between class and vote choice has weakened over time. Second, we use the same approach to study the association between social class and policy attitudes using our measures of redistribution, culture, and race policy attitudes as dependent variables. Third, we test whether the association between policy attitudes and voting behavior has changed over time and examine the role of issue salience in helping to understand how people connect their policy preferences to their presidential vote choice.

For all of the aggregate analyses we conduct that combine multiple years of survey data, we use multilevel regression with random intercepts for survey year to account for the clustering of the data. Our analysis of Democratic vote choice as the dependent variable is modeled using multilevel logistic regression and we use multilevel linear regression for all of the dependent variables that measure policy attitudes.

When we test whether the relationships between our main independent variables and outcomes have changed over time, we expand the multilevel model to include random coefficients, allowing the independent variable coefficient of interest to vary over time. When measures of class are the focus of the analysis we model random coefficients for each class measure to keep our analysis as straightforward as possible. Allowing the coefficients of our independent variables to vary by year in a mixed effects framework is a good approach because it does not require us to make assumptions about the functional form of over time trends and our estimates will be more precise by including all available

information in the models when compared with modeling each survey year separately. In any case, as a robustness check we also analyzed these over time relationships by modeling each survey year separately and include the results in the Appendix.[9]

Because our measures of class can all plausibly be precursors to the other measures, we model each class variable in separate models to avoid introducing bias into our model estimates.[10] In the appendix we also present the results of models that include all of the class measures simultaneously to demonstrate the robustness of our results.

We also consider whether it is appropriate to include measures of party identification and ideology as control variables in our models. These factors undoubtedly influence policy preferences and vote choice, but they are also likely driven to some extent by class (Evans 2010), which could induce post-treatment bias. If party identity and ideology are structural characteristics, as the political socialization literature suggests (Tyler and Iyengar N.d.), then excluding them from our models would likely lead to omitted variable bias. Of course, both of these scenarios are accurate to a certain extent. Given this ambiguity we present both sets of results. The results including party identification and ideology are shown in the main text and those excluding these variables are in the Appendix. While there are some differences between the models, the central conclusions of the paper are similar regardless. We provide a more detailed discussion of these models and their differences in the Appendix.

Results: Class and Voting

To preserve space and more effectively show the findings, all results are presented graphically, with numeric results found in Appendix E. We begin by examining whether class

[9]For these models we use standard logistic (for vote choice) and OLS (for policy preferences) regression. The estimated coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) for each class variable and each dependent variable from the separate regression models are plotted along with the equivalent coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) from the multilevel models in Appendix Figures F7-F14.

[10]For instance, since occupation is likely to result from particular levels of education including occupation as a covariate in a model where we are estimating the total effect of education on policy attitudes may result in biased coefficient estimates.

Figure 1: Effects of Class on Vote Choice, All Years



Note: The estimated effect differences for subjective class, income, and education are based on changing each variable from its 5th percentile value to its 95th percentile value. Since the EGP class categories are modeled as separate dummy variables, we estimate the difference between working class (the reference category) and upper class, as well as the difference between working class and upper middle class. For race the effect represents the difference between nonwhite and white respondents. All differences are based on results from separately modeled class variables. Bars represents 95% confidence intervals.

is associated with vote choice in presidential elections, showing estimates for all survey respondents, white respondents and nonwhite respondents.

Figure 1 shows the estimated effects of each social class variable on Democratic vote choice for all of the models (i.e., white, nonwhite, and all respondents) when changing from its 5th percentile value to its 95th percentile value. The EGP categories are modeled as separate dummy variables so we estimate the difference between working class (the reference category) and upper class, as well as the difference between working class and upper middle class. The bottom row represents the difference between nonwhite and white respondents, which is included for reference.

An important takeaway from Figure 1 is that the results are highly inconsistent. The estimated effects of class are statistically significant in some models and not in others,

and for the white respondents subsample and the full sample it is often associated with vote choice in the opposite direction of what is expected based on a purely economic view of class. For instance, those who subjectively associate with lower classes are less likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. For the EGP measures, only the upper class category is statistically significant in some of our models. And in both surveys, when the effects are statistically different from zero, those who belong to this group are more likely to vote Democrat, again in the opposite direction of what is expected. Income is related to vote choice in the expected direction but is not statistically significant for the white respondents subsample in the ANES data. Education is statistically different from zero in some models, but in the full sample and white subsample these effects are again opposite of what would be expected in the Industrial Era. Finally, Figure 1 unsurprisingly shows that nonwhite respondents support Democratic candidates at higher rates than whites.

To assess whether the relationship between class and voting has weakened more recently, we allow each of the social class measure coefficients to vary over time (i.e., we model random coefficients).[11] The results are presented in Figure 2. Not surprisingly given the results above, in many years there is no significant association between class and voting. Yet, nor is there a clear trend up or down in the GSS or ANES for any of the class measures. Interestingly, in some years we find that subjective class and education are significant, but again in the opposite of the Industrial Era. Income in the GSS model (the left column in Figure 2) is the only measure of class in any of the GSS or ANES models that is consistently related to vote choice in the expected (Industrial Era) direction.

As robustness checks in the Appendix we present the estimated over time effects of class on voting when using separate regression models for each survey year (Figure F7) and subsample models of white respondents only (Figure F8). Results are consistent with

[11]For the multilevel logistic regression models of vote choice, model convergence tends to becomes more difficult as more random effects are included. For this reason, we were unable to obtain random coefficient estimates for all four EGP class indicators in a single model when estimating random effects by year. Instead, we model random coefficients for the upper class and upper middle class categories in one set of estimates, and model random effects for the two middle class categories in a second model.

Figure 2: Over Time Effects of Class on Democratic Vote, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election. Depending on when the next survey is conducted by the GSS, the question is asked in either the following year or two years after the election. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question was asked by each survey.

those presented here. Overall, class is weakly and inconsistently associated with voting.

Results: Class and Policy Attitudes

Does the weak and inconsistent relationship observed above mean that class is also irrelevant for policy attitudes? Here, we replicate the models above, but using our policy attitudes as the dependent variables. Additionally, because our measures of race policy attitudes are specifically focused on policies associated with Blacks and other minorities, we only use white respondents when modeling the race policy attitudes variables. Others have demonstrated large race-based opinion gaps on these types of issues (Kinder and Winter 2001), making it potentially difficult to accurately model race policy attitudes when including white and minority respondents.

We begin with the overall baseline effects for all respondents in both survey samples and all years in Figure 3. We again plot the effect of each class measure when changing it from its 5th percentile value to its 95th percentile value, with the exception of the occupation measure. We see that class has a consistent effect on policy attitudes in the expected direction for both economic and non-economic issues. For both measures of preferences for redistribution, those who belong to the lower classes are more likely to favor government redistribution as presented in the GSS and ANES (top panels). These estimates are all statistically different from zero across all measures of class, with the exception that the difference between working class and upper-middle class occupations is not significant in the "reduce inequality" (GSS) question for the nonwhite subsample models.

In contrast to redistribution, as expected, those lower class individuals have more conservative views on culture and race policies. Looking more closely at the individual estimates for culture policy, while all of the estimates are statistically different from zero, it is also the case that education appears to play a more substantial role in influencing culture policy attitudes in the GSS data. For race policy it is clear that the effects of class are somewhat more muted relative to its influence on redistribution and culture issues. Additionally, while nearly all of the class effects on race policy are statistically

Figure 3: Effects of Class on Policy Attitudes, All Years



Note: The estimated effect differences for subjective class, income, and education are based on changing each variable from its 5th percentile value to its 95th percentile value. Since the EGP class categories are modeled as separate dummy variables, we estimate the difference between working class (the reference category) and upper class, as well as the difference between working class and upper middle class. For race the effect represents the difference between nonwhite and white respondents. All differences are based on results from separately modeled class variables. Bars represents 95% confidence intervals.

significant, the estimated effect of income is not statistically different from zero in the GSS or ANES models.

The estimated association between class and policy attitudes (the full sample of re-

Figure 4: Over Time Effects of Class on Redistribution Policy Attitudes, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy attitudes with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

spondents for redistribution and culture policy and white respondents only for race policy) over time are graphically presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6. The complete set of numeric results can be found in the Appendix. The estimated association between class and support for reducing inequality (left column in Figure 4) shows that while there are some years when the coefficient of a given measure jumps higher or lower, there is no evidence these effects are declining over time. The results are even more straightforward when

Figure 5: Over Time Effects of Class on Culture Policy Attitudes, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy attitudes with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

examining support for guaranteed jobs and income over time (the right column in Figure 4). There is so little variance from year-to-year in the random coefficient estimates movement in the effect sizes can hardly be detected in the figure. Even for the upper middle class coefficients, which do differ more over time than the other measures, there is no clear upward or downward trend in effect size.

Similar results are found when examining the over time influence of class on culture

Figure 6: Over Time Effects of Class on Race Policy Attitudes, White Respondents Only



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy attitudes with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

policy attitudes (see Figure 5), with the exception that all of the coefficients are positive as expected. Across all measures of class in both the GSS and ANES, the effect of class on culture attitudes is stable from the 1970s to the present. For one set of results, our measure of subjective class in the ANES, there is some indication of a downward trend but it is subtle and the estimated coefficient is always around 0.02 in all years.

Figure 6 demonstrates that occupation-based, education-based, and subjective mea-

sures of class all have a positive and statistically significant influence on race policy attitudes for all years in our analysis. This means that, comparable to the results for culture policy attitudes, those in higher classes have more liberal attitudes about race policy. Consistent with the results from the pooled models, income is again not statistically related to race policy attitudes.

In addition to the results described above, we also estimated a number of alternative models to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. In the Appendix we show the over time effects of class on policy attitudes when using separate regression models for each survey year (Figures F9, F10, and F11) and subsample models of white respondents only for the redistribution and culture analyses (Figures F12 and F13). The results are consistent with those presented here in the main text. Altogether, these results support our argument that class is consistently associated with policy attitudes.

Results: Policy Attitudes, Issue Salience, and Vote Choice

In this section, we first ask if the association between people's policy attitudes and vote choice has changed over time. If policy attitudes are becoming less important for how people vote it would suggest that class plays less of a role in vote choice via the diminishing link between policy preferences and voting behavior. Then, we consider whether the association between policy attitudes and vote choice for individuals is conditioned by issue salience.

Similar to our previous analyses of over time effects, we estimate the GSS and ANES measures of Democratic vote choice as a function of policy attitudes (and control variables), allowing each of the policy measure coefficients to vary over time (i.e., we model random coefficients). We estimate the effects of the three policy attitudes variables and their respective random coefficients on vote choice using separate models in order to include as many years as possible (since the policy questions we rely on are not asked in all

Figure 7: Over Time Effects of Policy Attitudes on Democratic Vote, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election. Depending on when the next survey is conducted by the GSS, the question is asked in either the following year or two years after the election. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question and policy questions were asked by each survey.

years) and to keep the model maximization process manageable. We present the results graphically in Figure 7 and provide the full set of numeric results from the multilevel logistic regression models in Appendix E.

The estimates in Figure 7 for the GSS data suggest that the associations between

Figure 8: Conditional Effects of Policy Attitudes on Vote Choice by Issue Salience, ANES



Note: Values are estimated marginal effects on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question and policy questions were asked by each survey.

policy attitudes and vote choice are either stable, in the case of race policy, or growing stronger over time in the case of views on redistribution and cultural issues. For the ANES, all of the estimates are relatively consistent over time for all three policies, with a slight upward trend in the size of coefficients for race policy attitudes.

In the Appendix we provide the results of alternative models estimating the effects of policy attitudes on voting when using separate regression models for each survey year (Figure F14) and subsample models of white respondents only (Figure F15). All of the results further support the conclusions we arrive at here in the main text.

To test whether the salience that people attach to the various policy dimensions shapes how these policy attitudes are associated with vote choice we model the association be-

tween policy attitudes and Democratic vote choice much as we did above, but now include our measure of individual issue salience and interaction terms between policy preferences and the corresponding salience measures. Since we are not examining over time differences in these conditional relationships and our salience variables are not available beyond 2004, we estimate multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts for survey year.

For brevity, we present the estimated marginal effects of policy attitudes on vote choice by issue salience in Figure 8. The full model results can be found in Appendix E. To summarize, we find statistically significant interaction terms for *guaranteed jobs/inc.* × *redistribution salient* and for *culture policy* × *culture salient*, but the *race policy* × *race salient* coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Figure 8 demonstrates that the effect of redistribution policy preferences is 0.09 larger ($p = 0.042$) for respondents who mention a redistribution-related issue as a major difference between the presidential candidates and/or parties. For culture policy attitudes, the effect on vote choice is 0.17 larger ($p < 0.001$) for those who state a cultural issue as a major candidate and/or party difference. The findings support, for redistribution and culture policy attitudes, the idea that the salience of an issue can shape the extent to which economic and non-economic policy preferences, and thus indirectly class, are associated with vote choice.

Conclusion and Implications

Many observers argue that class is of declining importance for American politics and, particularly, voting. But there are few studies that examine the relationship among class, policy preferences and voting, using various measures of class, over a relatively long period of time through recent years. We did find that class is only weakly and inconsistently associated with Democratic voting. However, we found that class strongly and consistently predicts policy attitudes on economic, cultural and minority policy dimensions. This often leads to conflict for voters, however, because class status is differentially as-

sociated with these policy attitudes. Finally, we found that the salience that individuals attach to these different issues conditions the relationship between policy attitudes and voting, and indirectly class and voting.

These findings are important for a number of reasons. First, we find that class still matters in the post-Industrial Era. Indeed, it matters a great deal for both policy attitudes and, indirectly, voting. Second, our findings have implications for understanding why the relationship between class and voting varies among individuals and over time. Over time, our results suggest that is is almost certainly the growing salience of non-economic issues that explains why class is no longer the same type of predictor of voting as it was in the 1940s or 1950s. At the individual-level, our findings indicate that two very similar individuals from a class perspective could have very similar policy attitudes but very different voting behavior depending on which policy dimensions are more salient to them.

Overall, these results help us to make sense of puzzles like why individuals (appear) to vote against their economic self-interest, and why the importance of class – viewed primarily as something that shapes economic policy preferences – has receded for voting. Regarding the question of why the working class has "abandoned" the Democratic Party, we can say that it has little to do with changes in preferences for redistribution that led these voters to support the Democratic Party in earlier eras and more to do with changes in the salience of economic issues.

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Appendix for:

Class, Policy Attitudes and U.S. Presidential Voting in the Post-Industrial Era

Contents

List of Figures

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Survey Response Rates for the GSS and ANES (AAPOR RR5)

	Response Rates	
Year	GSS	ANES
1972		75.0
1975	75.6	
1976	75.1	70.5
1977	76.5	
1978	73.5	68.9
1980	75.9	71.8
1982	77.5	72.4
1983	79.4	
1984	78.6	72.1
1985	78.7	
1986	75.6	70.8
1987	75.4	
1988	77.3	70.5
1989	77.6	
1990	73.9	71.4
1991	77.8	
1992		78.0
1993	82.4	
1994	77.8	74.1
1996	76.1	71.0
1998	75.6	63.9
2000	70.0	63.0
2002	70.1	
2004	70.4	66.1
2006	71.2	
2008	70.4	78.2
2010	70.3	
2012	71.4	
2014	60.2	
2016	61.3	84.0 / 86.6
2018	59.5	

Note: For 2016, the ANES response rate entry includes the rates for face-to-face and internet interviews, respectively.

Table A2: General Social Survey (GSS) Variables, Question Wording, and Descriptive Statistics

Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democratic Vote	Respondents who voted for the Democratic Party candidate in the presidential election. (Democratic vote = 1, Republican vote = 0.)	1977, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018	0.54	0.50	0	1
Reduce Inequality	Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? (Recoded to 0/1 scale.)	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.55	0.33	0	1
Culture Policy	See Appendix C	1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.64	0.28	0	1

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Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Race Policy	See Appendix C	1975, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.49	0.29	0	1
Subjective Class	If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	2.45	0.67	1	4
Upper Class	EGP social class measure (Morgan 2017) based on respondent's 2010 Census occupation code. See the text for measure details.	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.22	0.41	0	1
Upper Middle Class			0.20	0.40	0	1
Middle-Class Service			0.19	0.39	0	1
Middle-Class Manual			0.09	0.29	0	1
Working Class			0.30	0.46	0	1

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Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Income	Family income quintile.	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	2.98	1.42	1	5
Education	Education category based on respondent's highest year of scool completed. 1 = 0-8 years; 2 = 9-11 years; 3 = 12 years; 4 = 13-15 years; 5 = 16+ years.	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	3.46	1.21	1	5
Party ID	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	3.70	1.99	1	7
Ideology	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal–point 1–to extremely conservative–point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	4.11	1.39	1	7

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Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
White	Respondents who identify as white.	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.79	0.41	0	1
Age	Respondent's age.	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	46.29	17.54	18	89
Female	Respondent's sex.	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.56	0.50	0	1
South	Respondents living in southern states. (south = 1, nonsouth = 0.)	1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994-2018 (even years)	0.36	0.48	0	1

Table A3: American National Election Studies (ANES) Variables, Question Wording, and Descriptive Statistics

Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Democratic Vote	Respondents who voted for the Democratic Party candidate in the presidential election. (Democratic vote = 1, Republican vote = 0.)	1972-2016 (every four years)	0.53	0.50	0	1
Guaranteed Jobs and Income	Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his/their own. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (Recoded to 0/1 scale.)	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	0.45	0.31	0	1
Culture Policy	See Appendix C	1988-2016 (every four years)	0.68	0.32	0	1
Race Policy	See Appendix C	1970-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	0.42	0.3	0	1
Subjective Class	There's been some talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? Which one? (IF NO OR DK:) Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class or working class? (IF MIDDLE OR WORKING CLASS:) Would you say that you are about average middle/working class or that you are in the upper part of the middle/working class?	1972-1984 (even years), 1988-1994 (even years), 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	2.89	1.77	0	7

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Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Upper Class	EGP social class measure (Morgan 2017) based on respondent's 2010 Census occupation code. Occupation codes are considered sensitive data by the ANES and are only available via an application process. See the text for measure details.	1986-2004 (even years)	0.27	0.45	0	1
Upper Middle Class			0.19	0.39	0	1
Middle-Class Service			0.17	0.37	0	1
Middle-Class Manual			0.08	0.28	0	1
Working Class			0.29	0.45	0	1
Income	Family income quintile.	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	2.86	1.15	1	5
Education	Education category based on respondent's highest degree earned. 1 = 8 grades or less; 2 = 9-12 grades, no diploma/equivalency; 3 = 12 grades, diploma or equivalency plus non-academic training; 4 = some college, no degree, junior/community college level degree; 5 = BA level degrees, advanced degrees.	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	3.46	1.19	1	5

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Variable name	Question wording	Years available	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Party ID	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong (REP/DEM) or a not very strong (REP/DEM)? (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER OR NO PREFERENCE) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	3.66	2.05	1	7
Ideology	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, extremely conservative, or haven't you thought much about this?	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	4.23	1.42	1	7
White	Respondents who identify as white, non-Hispanic.	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	0.74	0.44	0	1
Age	Respondent's age.	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	46.59	17.63	17	99
Female	Respondent's sex.	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	0.54	0.50	0	1
South	Respondents living in southern states. (south = 1, nonsouth = 0.)	1972-2000 (even years), 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	0.37	0.48	0	1

Class measures and missing data

The patterns of missing values for our measures of social class are given below. Because occupation data is only available for the ANES from 1986 to 2004 (but not 2002) and within this time frame the subjective class question was not asked in 1986, 1996, 1998, or 2002, we only consider the following years when looking at missing data in the ANES surveys: 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2000, and 2004.

Table A4 presents the missing value patterns for the GSS and Table A5 gives the patterns for the ANES. In both tables, each column represents a class variable and each row a pattern. An entry of 1 in a pattern indicates a nonmissing observation and 0 indicates a missing observation. The last column of each table provides the percentage of observations that follow a given pattern. The patterns are listed in order from most to least common.

Table A4: Missing Value Patterns for Social Class Measures in the GSS

Missing value patterns								
scls	inc	edu	egp1	egp2	egp3	egp4	egp5	Percent
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	80%
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	<1
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	<1
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1

Note: For each pattern, 1 indicates a nonmissing observation and 0 indicates missing. The variables are scls = Subjective Class; inc = Income; edu = Education; egp1 = Upper Class; egp2 = Upper Middle Class; egp3 = Middle-Class Service; egp4 = Middle-Class Manual; egp5 = Working Class.

Table A5: Missing Value Patterns for Social Class Measures in the ANES

Missing value patterns								
scls	inc	edu	egp1	egp2	egp3	egp4	egp5	Percent
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	74%
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	12
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	<1
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	<1
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	<1
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1

Note: For each pattern, 1 indicates a nonmissing observation and 0 indicates missing. The variables are scls = Subjective Class; inc = Income; edu = Education; egp1 = Upper Class; egp2 = Upper Middle Class; egp3 = Middle-Class Service; egp4 = Middle-Class Manual; egp5 = Working Class.

The first pattern for the GSS and ANES class measures is a series of all 1s, which means that all of the variables have nonmissing observations. This is the most common pattern among the two surveys, with 80% of GSS respondents and 74% of ANES respondents having nonmissing values for all of our class measures. The most common patterns of missing data in both surveys is missing data on income alone and the EGP class measures alone. Income is missing, with all other class measures having nonmissing values, for 8% of GSS observations and 7% of ANES observations. Missing data on our EGP class measures, with all other class measures having nonmissing values, make up 6% of GSS observations and 12% of ANES observations. All other missing value patterns for both surveys make up less than 5% of all observations.

Correlations between class measures

Table A6: Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients for Social Class Measures in the GSS

	scls	inc	edu	egp1	egp2	egp3	egp4	egp5
scls	1.00							
inc	0.36	1.00						
edu	0.29	0.40	1.00					
egp1	0.27	0.31	0.49	1.00				
egp2	0.05	0.06	0.07	-0.26	1.00			
egp3	-0.08	-0.16	-0.11	-0.26	-0.24	1.00		
egp4	0.02	0.07	0.04	-0.17	-0.16	-0.15	1.00	
egp5	-0.23	-0.24	-0.43	-0.35	-0.32	-0.32	-0.21	1.00

Note: The variables are scls = Subjective Class; inc = Income; edu = Education; egp1 = Upper Class; egp2 = Upper Middle Class; egp3 = Middle-Class Service; egp4 = Middle-Class Manual; egp5 = Working Class.

Table A7: Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients for Social Class Measures in the ANES

	scls	inc	edu	egp1	egp2	egp3	egp4	egp5
scls	1.00							
inc	0.35	1.00						
edu	0.36	0.39	1.00					
egp1	0.32	0.31	0.50	1.00				
egp2	0.03	0.02	0.05	-0.29	1.00			
egp3	-0.09	-0.15	-0.13	-0.27	-0.21	1.00		
egp4	0.00	0.06	0.02	-0.19	-0.14	-0.13	1.00	
egp5	-0.27	-0.24	-0.44	-0.39	-0.31	-0.29	-0.19	1.00

Note: The variables are scls = Subjective Class; inc = Income; edu = Education; egp1 = Upper Class; egp2 = Upper Middle Class; egp3 = Middle-Class Service; egp4 = Middle-Class Manual; egp5 = Working Class.

Appendix B: The EGP Social Class Measures

To create measures of occupation-based social class, we rely on Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero's (1979), or EGP, class categorization to account for class groupings among respondents from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Studies (ANES). Class categories are based on updates to the EGP scheme by Morgan (2017), which uses the more current (i.e., the 2012 American Community Survey) Census occupation titles (539 distinct occupations) to classify individuals into several class groupings. In addition to Morgan's update making the EGP measure more compatible with current Census occupations, it also offers some modest changes to how some occupations are categorized. Most of the changes were made to occupations from the more heterogeneous classes IIIa and V to make the measure more reflective of the U.S. labor market that has emerged over the past few decades. The EGP measure was originally developed at a time when the industrial economy prevailed, so Morgan's work provides a welcome update to the measure.

As part of the the project that updates the EGP class measure, Morgan (2017) provides a crosswalk to create the EGP measure for GSS respondents (see `https://osf.io/9nkrw/`), which we use for our analysis of the GSS data. Creating the measure for ANES respondents, however, is more difficult since the ANES has not updated its occupation codes to the more recent Census versions. To convert 1980, 1990, and 2000 occupation codes to the 2010 version used by Morgan, we rely on crosswalks created by the IPUMS project (see `https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/occ_ind.shtml`). Another limitation of the ANES occupation data is that occupation codes are only available for ANES respondents in survey years between 1986 and 2004. It should also be noted that occupation codes are considered restricted data by the ANES, meaning an application process is required for researchers who would like access to these data.

In both the GSS and ANES, respondents who were not working at the time of the interview were asked about the work they normally do or work they did at their past

occupation. This means that all respondents with a previous employment history have the opportunity to identify their occupation regardless of their work status when they are interviewed.

While our study uses a version of the EGP that consists of five categories (see Table 1 in the main text), the updated EGP scheme specifies 10-class, 11-class, and 12-class versions of the measure. We initially created the 10-class version of the EGP measure for GSS and ANES respondents. We started with the 10-class version of the EGP since additional information about the respondents' employment, beyond occupation, is needed to create the 11-class and 12-class versions of the measure. Specifically, the 11-class measure is based on identifying self-employed respondents and the 12-class measure relies on knowing the number of employees self-employed respondents have working for them. The ANES does not ask respondents about self-employment, meaning the 10-class version of the EGP is the only measure that can be created using the ANES. Although the GSS does ask about self-employment, we rely on the 10-class version to make the EGP measures as comparable as possible across the surveys.

After creating the 10-class version of the EGP measure for both surveys, we then further reduced the number of class groupings for a couple of reasons. The first is that very few respondents from the survey samples belonged to two of the class categories. Very few respondents in the GSS (0.78%) and in the ANES (1.10%) were classified into class IVc. Also, less than 1% of respondents from the GSS (0.77%) and ANES (0.05%) belong to the military class. Since there is no comparable class to include those in class IVc or members of the armed forces, we drop these categories from the analysis when using the EGP measure.

With the remaining eight categories we then combined several EGP classes into larger class groupings to arrive at our final five categories. The mapping between the 10-class version of the EGP and our five-class version can be found in Table B1. We reduced the number of class categories to five as a way to make sure we had enough respondents in each group for the analyses, particularly when estimating the random coefficient models. We

Table B1: Mapping between Morgan's (2017) 10-Class Version of the EGP Measure and the Five Category Version

Five category version	Original EGP categories	Descriptions
Upper Class	Class I	Higher-grade professionals, administrators, managers, and officials
Upper Class	Class II	Lower-grade professionals, administrators, managers, and officials
Upper Middle Class	Class IIIa	Routine non-manual and service employees, higher-grade
Middle-Class Service	Class IIIb	Routine non-manual and service employees, lower-grade
(Not included)	Class IVc	Owners and managers of agricultural establishments
Middle-Class Manual	Class V	Higher-grade technicians and repairers, public safety workers, performers, and supervisors of manual workers
Working Class	Class VI	Skilled manual workers, lower-grade technicians, installers, and repairers
Working Class	Class VIIa	Semiskilled and unskilled manual workers, not in agriculture
Working Class	Class VIIb	Agricultural workers and their first-line supervisors, and other workers in primary production
(Not included)	Military	All members of the armed forces

determined which groups would be combined based on the similarities of the occupations included in each group and following the approaches used by previous researchers (Morgan 2017).

We can see in Figure B1 that the occupation-based measure of class is not simply measuring income and education in another way. There are people from a variety of income and education groups in every class category, suggesting that our occupation-based class measure accounts for an aspect of social class not captured by the more common income and education indicators.[1]

[1]We chose this set of surveys to give a contemporary look at these relationships. Surveys are pooled going back to 2006 so that each class category has a reasonable number of respondents to examine. Changing the time period of observation does not change the general conclusion that the class groupings are not simply proxies for income or education.

Figure B1: Distribution of Income and Education by EGP Social Class Categories

Note: Class categories are based on EGP class categorizations that were constructed using 2010 Census occupation codes (Morgan 2017). See the text for measure details. Distributions (weighted) are based on GSS respondents from 2006 to 2016 survey years.

Reliability of the EGP measure created for ANES respondents

Morgan (2017) updated EGP classification is particularly well suited for over time analyses using the GSS in large part due to the GSS recoding respondent occupation descriptions to the 2010 Census occupations codes for all of their surveys dating back to the 1970s. This means that the GSS includes 2010 Census occupations codes for all respondents, providing a consistent measure of occupation for every year the survey was conducted. This is important since Census occupation codes have changed over time with substantial changes to occupation categories in some years.

As discussed above, the ANES only provides the Census codes that were originally included with the survey releases. For this reason we rely on Census occupation code crosswalks to convert the 1980, 1990, and 2000 occupation codes in the ANES to the 2010 Census codes prior to creating the EGP measures. While the occupation crosswalks are the best tools available to us to create consistent over time occupation codes in the ANES, the conversions are not perfect. When the Census changes its occupation codes, some occupation categories are split into multiple categories. In these cases crosswalk

conversions are not one-to-one and there will be some unavoidable error when making the conversions.

To assess the reliability of our EGP measurement approach for the ANES, we take advantage of the inclusion of both old and new Census occupation codes in the GSS. Even though the GSS recoded occupations to the 2010 census codes for all survey years, in some years respondents are "double coded" and also have their occupations coded to the old 1980 Census codes. This allows us to compare the GSS EGP measure we use in the paper and a measure of EGP that relies on the same crosswalk method we use for the ANES data (i.e., converting the 1980 codes to the 2010 codes) for the same exact set of respondents.[2] We create both EGP measures for years that closely coincide with the ANES surveys that include the 1980 Census codes. The GSS survey years we use for the reliability study include 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996. The ANES analyses using our EGP measure in the main text require us to convert 1980 codes to 2010 codes using crosswalks for the following survey years: 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996.

To compare the level of agreement between the two measures we use three common reliability statistics: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient, the kappa measure of inter-rater agreement, and Krippendorff's alpha reliability coefficient. The results are presented in Table B2. All three test statistics suggest that there is strong agreement between the two measures of EGP. The Cronbach's alpha of 0.906 is well above the standard 0.70 used as the threshold for sufficient reliability. The kappa coefficient of 0.732 falls in the 0.61-0.80 range, which indicates "substantial" agreement,[3] and the Krippendorff's alpha of 0.825 is above the 0.75 benchmark used in other studies.[4] While it would be ideal to have consistent over time occupation codes for all respondents in the ANES time series

[2]Although we also use crosswalks for 1990 and 2000 codes for some ANES survey years, the GSS does not include these older Census codes in their surveys.

[3]Landis, J. Richard, and Gary G. Koch. "The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data." Biometrics 33, no. 1 (1977): 159–74. https://doi.org/10.2307/2529310, p. 165.

[4]Mitnik, Pablo A., and Erin Cumberworth. "Measuring Social Class with Changing Occupational Classifications: Reliability, Competing Measurement Strategies, and the 1970–1980 U.S. Classification Divide." Sociological Methods & Research 50, no. 1 (2021): 265–309. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118769084.

surveys, this evidence suggests that our crosswalk approach produces a reliable measure of EGP class.

Table B2: Reliability Test Statistics for Comparison Between Two EGP Measurement Approaches

Measure of agreement	Coefficient
Cronbach's alpha	0.906
kappa	0.732
Krippendorff's alpha	0.825

Appendix C: Measuring Policy Attitudes and Issue Salience

Redistribution policy

GSS

1. Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?

ANES

1. Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his/their own. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Culture policy

GSS: abortion

Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if ...

1. ... The woman wants it for any reason?

2. . . . If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?

3. . . . If she is married and does not want any more children?

4. . . . If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?

5. . . . If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?

6. . . . If she became pregnant as a result of rape?

7. . . . If she is not married and does not want to marry the man?

GSS: LGBTQ rights

1. And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?

2. And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

3. And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

4. What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex – do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

ANES: abortion

1. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? 1. By law, abortion should never be permitted. 2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. 3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the

need for the abortion has been clearly established. 4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

ANES: LGBTQ rights

1. Do you favor or oppose laws to protect [homosexuals/gays and lesbians] against job discrimination?

Race policy

GSS

1. "Some people think that Blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to Blacks. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?"

2. "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. ... are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on ... improving the conditions of Blacks?"

ANES

1. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

Issue salience

Our measures of redistribution, culture, and race issue salience are created using open-ended questions from the ANES about what respondents like and dislike about the presidential candidates and the two main political parties. Theses questions are asked in ANES pre-election survey while our measure of vote choice is asked post-election. Specifically, the questions ask:

1. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic party?
2. Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic party?
3. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican party?
4. Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Republican party?
5. Is there anything in particular about DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE that might make you want to vote for him?
6. Is there anything in particular about DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE that might make you want to vote against him?
7. Is there anything in particular about REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE that might make you want to vote for him?
8. Is there anything in particular about REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE that might make you want to vote against him?

Responses to these questions are used to determine whether the policy issues we assess in our research are salient to each respondent. For responses to the eight questions listed above, we consider the issues of redistribution, culture, and race to be salient if respondents mention any of the following terms for each topic area. The salience variables are dichotomous, indicating whether a term was mentioned (coded 1) or not (coded 0):

- *Redistribution issue salience* terms: (Would) Spend less (than other side); (would) spend too little; (Would) Spend more (than other side); (would) spend too much; For government activity; believe government should take care of things; for big government/ wants government bigger; supports social programs/ spending; would spend more on domestic needs; Against government activity; believe government involved in too many things; favors reduction in social programs/ spending; against big government/ wants government smaller; wouldn't spend enough on domestic needs; spend enough/too much on; Government economic controls – Pro; we need planned economy; control of private enterprise – Anti; we have too much interference in private enterprise; Tax policy – Pro lower taxes – Anti lower taxes; for higher taxes – Pro reform/fairer system/end of loopholes/ write-offs/dodges – Anti reform/fairer system/end of loopholes/ write-offs/dodges; Wages/ Salaries/ Income/ Employment – higher/better under him/them – lower/worse under him/them; Polarization of classes/increasing gap between rich and poor – will stop trend/handle better – will accelerate trend/handle worse

- *Culture issue salience* terms: Public morality – Strict/older/traditionalistic outlook; improve/renew morality of country; pro-family; defends family values – Permissive/newer/modernistic outlook; not (strongly enough) pro-family; doesn't defend (strongly enough) family values; Abortion and birth control – Pro reform/legalization; new outlook – Anti reform/legalization; traditional outlook; Gay rights; Gay marriages – Pro – Anti; Gays/ lesbians/ homosexuals – Pro – Anti

- *Race issue salience* terms: Welfare/Poverty problems – give-aways – Pro government aid/activity; pro give-aways – Anti government aid/activity; anti give-aways; pro self-help; Blacks/ Black people/ African-Americans – Pro – Anti; People on welfare/ ADC mothers – Pro – Anti

It should be apparent from the terms we use to identify issue salience that our intent is to capture the salience of topics that correspond to our measures of redistribution,

culture, and race policy attitudes. For this reason, we chose not to use the most important problem question to create our salience measures. We do not view the most important problem question to be an inherently problematic way to account for salience, but the coded responses tend to be too broad for our purposes.

Appendix D: Model Estimation

The modeling approach we take for all of our analyses is to model the GSS and ANES data as pooled, multilevel observations. Since we are using survey responses from multiple survey years, our models are estimated using multilevel logistic (when vote choice is the dependent variable) or linear (when policy attitudes is the dependent variable) regression with respondents nested within each survey year. The general model can be summarized as:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} =& \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} SubjectiveClass_{ij} + \gamma_{20} Ideology_{ij} + \gamma_{30} Age_{ij} + \\ & \gamma_{40} Female_{ij} + \gamma_{50} South_{ij} + \gamma_{60} White_{ij} + \\ & u_{0j} + e_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where Y is one of our dependent variables — that is, vote choice or policy attitudes — and is modeled as a function of individual (i) characteristics within each survey year (j). The γ estimates can be thought of as the fixed portions of the model while the u terms can be considered random effects. The u_{0j} term simply indicates that the model intercept can vary by year. In this model we include $SubjectiveClass$, but replacing this variable with our other measures of class (i.e., the EGP measure, income, or education) or measures of policy attitudes (i.e., redistribution, culture, or race) will give the model used for all of our analyses.

We can expand this model to allow any of the independent variable coefficients to vary by year, which is the approach we take to estimate whether the effect of class has changed over time. For instance, we use the following model to estimate the effect of subjective class for each survey year included in the analysis:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} =& \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} SubjectiveClass_{ij} + \gamma_{20} Ideology_{ij} + \gamma_{30} Age_{ij} + \\ & \gamma_{40} Female_{ij} + \gamma_{50} South_{ij} + \gamma_{60} White_{ij} + \\ & u_{0j} + u_{1j} SubjectiveClass_{ij} + e_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

This model includes a second random term, u_{1j}, which allows the effect of subjective class to vary by year. The year-specific coefficient for subjective class is estimated as the difference from the overall average effect of subjective class, which is provided by the γ_{10} term. The same approach is used when estimating the over time effects of each facet of social class and policy attitudes we consider in the study.

Appendix E: Numeric Results for Figures Presented in Main Text

Class and vote choice, pooled models

Table E1: The Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (GSS), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.039					0.107^{+}
	(0.045)					(0.056)
Upper Class		0.206*				0.086
		(0.081)				(0.105)
Upper Mid. Class		0.001				-0.014
		(0.087)				(0.100)
Mid.-Class Service		0.183^{+}				0.094
		(0.094)				(0.104)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.163				0.090
		(0.106)				(0.118)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.079***			-0.133***
			(0.021)			(0.027)
Education				0.074**		0.127***
				(0.025)		(0.036)
Party ID	-0.911***	-0.919***	-0.897***	-0.914***	-0.909***	-0.917***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Ideology	-0.468***	-0.485***	-0.483***	-0.465***	-0.467***	-0.492***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Age	-0.003^{+}	-0.003	-0.004*	-0.002	-0.004*	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.071	0.038	0.072	0.070	0.069	0.043
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.067)
South	-0.265***	-0.249***	-0.282***	-0.253***	-0.257***	-0.283***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.066)
White	-1.559***	-1.513***	-1.484***	-1.507***	-1.484***	-1.606***
	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.104)
Constant	6.922***	6.969***	7.281***	6.665***	6.964***	6.816***
	(0.241)	(0.225)	(0.237)	(0.240)	(0.217)	(0.279)
N	12756	12930	12614	13727	13744	11053

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E2: The Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (GSS), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.093^{+}					0.142*
	(0.049)					(0.061)
Upper Class		0.217*				0.043
		(0.086)				(0.112)
Upper Mid. Class		0.001				-0.060
		(0.094)				(0.107)
Mid.-Class Service		0.141				0.032
		(0.101)				(0.112)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.133				0.036
		(0.113)				(0.126)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.064**			-0.123***
			(0.023)			(0.028)
Education				0.092***		0.138***
				(0.027)		(0.038)
Party ID	-0.926***	-0.926***	-0.905***	-0.926***	-0.919***	-0.926***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Ideology	-0.483***	-0.506***	-0.505***	-0.484***	-0.488***	-0.508***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003^{+}	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.030	0.001	0.035	0.031	0.028	0.023
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.071)
South	-0.353***	-0.326***	-0.353***	-0.333***	-0.334***	-0.356***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.071)
Constant	5.355***	5.559***	5.848***	5.185***	5.591***	5.167***
	(0.239)	(0.218)	(0.234)	(0.240)	(0.209)	(0.281)
N	10355	10481	10216	11121	11134	8964

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E3: The Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (GSS), Nonwhite Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.347**					-0.191
	(0.130)					(0.160)
Upper Class		0.059				0.309
		(0.246)				(0.326)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.027				0.234
		(0.247)				(0.300)
Mid.-Class Service		0.513^{+}				0.603*
		(0.264)				(0.301)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.449				0.398
		(0.317)				(0.365)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.151*			-0.187*
			(0.059)			(0.078)
Education				-0.028		0.060
				(0.072)		(0.107)
Party ID	-0.852***	-0.882***	-0.857***	-0.857***	-0.857***	-0.881***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.055)
Ideology	-0.336***	-0.343***	-0.326***	-0.328***	-0.321***	-0.356***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.072)
Age	-0.008	-0.011^{+}	-0.011*	-0.011*	-0.011*	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Female	0.377*	0.303^{+}	0.351*	0.359*	0.368*	0.170
	(0.172)	(0.182)	(0.172)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.208)
South	0.288^{+}	0.238	0.155	0.236	0.236	0.186
	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.162)	(0.198)
Constant	6.898***	6.253***	6.708***	6.323***	6.176***	7.025***
	(0.575)	(0.511)	(0.532)	(0.573)	(0.465)	(0.730)
N	2401	2449	2398	2606	2610	2089

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E4: The Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (ANES), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.025					0.079^{+}
	(0.016)					(0.045)
Upper Class		0.265				0.170
		(0.162)				(0.233)
Upper Mid. Class		0.132				0.127
		(0.188)				(0.234)
Mid.-Class Service		0.121				0.146
		(0.203)				(0.248)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.466*				-0.270
		(0.230)				(0.290)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.089***			-0.093
			(0.027)			(0.076)
Education				0.043		0.034
				(0.027)		(0.089)
Party ID	-0.885***	-0.934***	-0.886***	-0.889***	-0.887***	-0.953***
	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.041)
Ideology	-0.659***	-0.672***	-0.669***	-0.659***	-0.664***	-0.673***
	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.061)
Age	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.006***	-0.004*	-0.005**	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Female	-0.015	-0.133	-0.042	-0.019	-0.024	-0.128
	(0.056)	(0.122)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.150)
South	-0.356***	-0.400**	-0.372***	-0.368***	-0.369***	-0.319*
	(0.061)	(0.126)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.153)
White	-1.228***	-0.964***	-1.215***	-1.245***	-1.226***	-1.023***
	(0.077)	(0.156)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.187)
Constant	7.335***	7.615***	7.882***	7.298***	7.494***	7.551***
	(0.229)	(0.365)	(0.245)	(0.249)	(0.221)	(0.565)
N	13705	3505	14260	14844	14957	2402

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E5: The Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (ANES), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.043*					0.097*
	(0.018)					(0.050)
Upper Class		0.389*				0.215
		(0.178)				(0.259)
Upper Mid. Class		0.218				0.175
		(0.207)				(0.261)
Mid.-Class Service		-0.007				0.066
		(0.225)				(0.281)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.405				-0.293
		(0.253)				(0.323)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.031			-0.062
			(0.030)			(0.085)
Education				0.121***		0.091
				(0.031)		(0.099)
Party ID	-0.871***	-0.909***	-0.874***	-0.879***	-0.870***	-0.949***
	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.046)
Ideology	-0.701***	-0.710***	-0.709***	-0.698***	-0.708***	-0.694***
	(0.029)	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.068)
Age	-0.004*	-0.000	-0.005**	-0.002	-0.004*	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Female	-0.058	-0.214	-0.055	-0.048	-0.059	-0.215
	(0.062)	(0.133)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.166)
South	-0.500***	-0.506***	-0.507***	-0.509***	-0.510***	-0.464**
	(0.069)	(0.140)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.173)
Constant	6.189***	6.692***	6.603***	5.849***	6.424***	6.201***
	(0.235)	(0.368)	(0.256)	(0.259)	(0.225)	(0.610)
N	10535	2873	10985	11457	11538	1946

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E6: The Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (ANES), Nonwhite Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.066^{+}					-0.106
	(0.039)					(0.119)
Upper Class		-0.370				-0.161
		(0.404)				(0.546)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.269				-0.109
		(0.477)				(0.566)
Mid.-Class Service		1.048^{+}				0.484
		(0.549)				(0.586)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.669				-0.137
		(0.558)				(0.716)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.305***			-0.137
			(0.061)			(0.178)
Education				-0.231***		-0.249
				(0.062)		(0.215)
Party ID	-0.931***	-1.072***	-0.929***	-0.931***	-0.940***	-1.017***
	(0.039)	(0.093)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.106)
Ideology	-0.494***	-0.554***	-0.527***	-0.504***	-0.497***	-0.670***
	(0.055)	(0.127)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.153)
Age	-0.010*	-0.003	-0.010*	-0.009*	-0.008*	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)
Female	0.126	0.328	-0.018	0.074	0.101	0.342
	(0.134)	(0.325)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.381)
South	0.187	0.016	0.149	0.146	0.181	0.196
	(0.135)	(0.309)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.367)
Constant	6.866***	7.449***	7.885***	7.690***	6.759***	9.185***
	(0.375)	(0.847)	(0.427)	(0.446)	(0.349)	(1.396)
N	3170	632	3275	3387	3419	456

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Class and vote choice, over time models

Table E7: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (GSS), All Respondents

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP (1) b/se	EGP (2) b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.037				
	(0.054)				
Upper Class		0.192*	0.206*		
		(0.091)	(0.081)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.011	0.001		
		(0.099)	(0.087)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.183^{+}	0.183^{+}		
		(0.094)	(0.094)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.163	0.163		
		(0.106)	(0.106)		
Working Class (ref.)					
Income				-0.079***	
				(0.021)	
Education					0.076^{+}
					(0.040)
Party ID	-0.912***	-0.920***	-0.919***	-0.897***	-0.916***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ideology	-0.468***	-0.485***	-0.485***	-0.483***	-0.464***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Age	-0.003^{+}	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004*	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.073	0.039	0.038	0.072	0.070
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.055)
South	-0.264***	-0.250***	-0.249***	-0.282***	-0.254***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.058)
White	-1.560***	-1.516***	-1.513***	-1.484***	-1.511***
	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.089)
Constant	6.935***	6.979***	6.969***	7.281***	6.666***
	(0.235)	(0.226)	(0.225)	(0.237)	(0.287)
N	12756	12930	12930	12614	13727

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP (1)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Upper Class and Upper Middle Class. For the *EGP (2)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Middle-Class Service and Middle-Class Manual.

Table E8: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (ANES), All Respondents

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP (1) b/se	EGP (2) b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.018				
	(0.032)				
Upper Class		0.265	0.265		
		(0.162)	(0.162)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.132	0.132		
		(0.188)	(0.188)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.121	0.121		
		(0.203)	(0.203)		
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.466*	-0.466*		
		(0.230)	(0.230)		
Working Class (ref.)					
Income				-0.105*	
				(0.045)	
Education					0.026
					(0.045)
Party ID	-0.887***	-0.934***	-0.934***	-0.888***	-0.890***
	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ideology	-0.661***	-0.672***	-0.672***	-0.670***	-0.661***
	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Age	-0.006**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.007***	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.013	-0.133	-0.133	-0.042	-0.021
	(0.056)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.056)	(0.054)
South	-0.360***	-0.400**	-0.400**	-0.377***	-0.368***
	(0.061)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.060)	(0.059)
White	-1.234***	-0.964***	-0.964***	-1.216***	-1.244***
	(0.077)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.076)	(0.074)
Constant	7.384***	7.615***	7.615***	7.954***	7.381***
	(0.218)	(0.365)	(0.365)	(0.249)	(0.286)
N	13705	3505	3505	14260	14844

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP (1)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Upper Class and Upper Middle Class. For the *EGP (2)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Middle-Class Service and Middle-Class Manual.

Class and redistribution policy attitudes, pooled models

Table E9: The Effect of Social Class on Reducing Inequality Policy Attitudes (GSS), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.066***					-0.036***
	(0.003)					(0.003)
Upper Class		-0.104***				-0.017**
		(0.005)				(0.006)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.077***				-0.025***
		(0.005)				(0.006)
Mid.-Class Service		-0.033***				-0.009
		(0.005)				(0.006)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.067***				-0.021**
		(0.007)				(0.007)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.035***			-0.020***
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Education				-0.042***		-0.022***
				(0.002)		(0.002)
Party ID	-0.034***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.036***	-0.034***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.035***	-0.038***	-0.036***	-0.038***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.042***	0.056***	0.034***	0.043***	0.044***	0.042***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
South	-0.015***	-0.018***	-0.019***	-0.022***	-0.015***	-0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
White	-0.065***	-0.066***	-0.055***	-0.062***	-0.075***	-0.050***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	1.046***	0.946***	1.006***	1.072***	0.909***	1.139***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)
N	30863	28833	28184	30955	30992	26248

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E10: The Effect of Social Class on Reducing Inequality Policy Attitudes (GSS), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.074***					-0.037***
	(0.003)					(0.004)
Upper Class		-0.114***				-0.021**
		(0.006)				(0.007)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.088***				-0.032***
		(0.006)				(0.007)
Mid.-Class Service		-0.043***				-0.015*
		(0.006)				(0.007)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.072***				-0.022**
		(0.007)				(0.008)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.038***			-0.022***
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Education				-0.045***		-0.023***
				(0.002)		(0.002)
Party ID	-0.035***	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.038***	-0.035***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.039***	-0.043***	-0.040***	-0.042***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.046***	0.062***	0.039***	0.047***	0.048***	0.048***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
South	-0.016***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.022***	-0.015***	-0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	1.022***	0.907***	0.983***	1.049***	0.858***	1.124***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.014)
N	24747	23249	22638	24814	24837	21218

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E11: The Effect of Social Class on Reducing Inequality Policy Attitudes (GSS), Nonwhite Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.036***					-0.023***
	(0.006)					(0.007)
Upper Class		-0.061***				0.003
		(0.012)				(0.015)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.024^{+}				0.011
		(0.012)				(0.014)
Mid.-Class Service		0.007				0.020
		(0.011)				(0.012)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.044**				-0.014
		(0.016)				(0.017)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.019***			-0.010**
			(0.003)			(0.004)
Education				-0.026***		-0.020***
				(0.003)		(0.005)
Party ID	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Ideology	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.019***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.000	-0.000^{+}	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.022**	0.024**	0.015^{+}	0.023**	0.023**	0.014
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
South	-0.009	-0.009	-0.015^{+}	-0.013^{+}	-0.008	-0.016^{+}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.867***	0.808***	0.856***	0.892***	0.784***	0.962***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.028)
N	6116	5584	5546	6141	6155	5030

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E12: The Effect of Social Class on Guaranteed Jobs and Income Policy Attitudes (ANES), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.013***					-0.008**
	(0.001)					(0.002)
Upper Class		-0.053***				-0.028*
		(0.008)				(0.012)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.075***				-0.056***
		(0.010)				(0.013)
Mid.-Class Service		-0.032***				-0.032**
		(0.010)				(0.012)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.053***				-0.036*
		(0.011)				(0.015)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.031***			-0.021***
			(0.002)			(0.004)
Education				-0.016***		0.002
				(0.002)		(0.004)
Party ID	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.029***	-0.026***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.046***	-0.038***	-0.045***	-0.046***	-0.045***	-0.039***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.038***	0.053***	0.030***	0.036***	0.037***	0.038***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
South	-0.006	-0.007	-0.010**	-0.005	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)
White	-0.106***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.110***	-0.116***	-0.084***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Constant	0.862***	0.827***	0.922***	0.898***	0.833***	0.892***
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.027)
N	22827	8414	24979	26204	26445	5228

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E13: The Effect of Social Class on Guaranteed Jobs and Income Policy Attitudes (ANES), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.012***					-0.009***
	(0.001)					(0.003)
Upper Class		-0.043***				-0.021
		(0.009)				(0.013)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.065***				-0.053***
		(0.010)				(0.014)
Mid.-Class Service		-0.032**				-0.037**
		(0.011)				(0.014)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.044***				-0.037*
		(0.012)				(0.016)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.028***			-0.018***
			(0.002)			(0.004)
Education				-0.010***		0.004
				(0.002)		(0.005)
Party ID	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.025***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.051***	-0.044***	-0.050***	-0.051***	-0.050***	-0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.035***	0.052***	0.030***	0.035***	0.035***	0.037***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)
South	-0.010*	-0.008	-0.013**	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.008
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Constant	0.769***	0.733***	0.827***	0.778***	0.732***	0.807***
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.028)
N	17895	6705	19593	20564	20747	4125

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E14: The Effect of Social Class on Guaranteed Jobs and Income Policy Attitudes (ANES), Nonwhite Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	-0.015***					-0.007
	(0.003)					(0.006)
Upper Class		-0.090***				-0.058^{+}
		(0.021)				(0.032)
Upper Mid. Class		-0.107***				-0.065*
		(0.023)				(0.031)
Mid.-Class Service		-0.032				-0.019
		(0.022)				(0.028)
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.083**				-0.027
		(0.029)				(0.038)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			-0.041***			-0.026**
			(0.004)			(0.009)
Education				-0.036***		-0.001
				(0.004)		(0.011)
Party ID	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.033***	-0.035***	-0.027***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Ideology	-0.032***	-0.023***	-0.031***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.027***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Age	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.000^{+}	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Female	0.042***	0.052**	0.027***	0.036***	0.038***	0.037^{+}
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.020)
South	0.005	-0.011	-0.004	0.001	0.004	-0.006
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)
Constant	0.830***	0.807***	0.908***	0.932***	0.794***	0.874***
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.062)
N	4932	1709	5386	5640	5698	1103

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Class and culture policy attitudes, pooled models

Table E15: The Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (GSS), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.056***					0.010***
	(0.002)					(0.003)
Upper Class		0.172***				0.064***
		(0.004)				(0.006)
Upper Mid. Class		0.122***				0.059***
		(0.005)				(0.005)
Mid.-Class Service		0.063***				0.036***
		(0.005)				(0.005)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.113***				0.058***
		(0.006)				(0.006)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.035***			0.012***
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Education				0.070***		0.049***
				(0.001)		(0.002)
Party ID	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.051***	-0.050***	-0.052***	-0.048***	-0.052***	-0.049***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.001	-0.019***	0.011***	-0.000	-0.002	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
South	-0.086***	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.075***	-0.086***	-0.073***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
White	0.081***	0.074***	0.071***	0.068***	0.090***	0.062***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.838***	0.898***	0.855***	0.682***	0.956***	0.681***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
N	26617	24717	24705	26670	26704	22889

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E16: The Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (GSS), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.068***					0.014***
	(0.003)					(0.003)
Upper Class		0.173***				0.060***
		(0.005)				(0.006)
Upper Mid. Class		0.125***				0.061***
		(0.005)				(0.006)
Mid.-Class Service		0.065***				0.036***
		(0.006)				(0.006)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.114***				0.056***
		(0.006)				(0.007)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.036***			0.012***
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Education				0.073***		0.051***
				(0.001)		(0.002)
Party ID	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.006***	-0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.060***	-0.056***	-0.060***	-0.057***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.004	-0.023***	0.007*	-0.003	-0.005	-0.008*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
South	-0.079***	-0.074***	-0.074***	-0.067***	-0.078***	-0.067***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.907***	0.990***	0.941***	0.755***	1.060***	0.746***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
N	21385	19965	19874	21427	21450	18506

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E17: The Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (GSS), Nonwhite Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.013*					-0.009
	(0.005)					(0.006)
Upper Class		0.169***				0.074***
		(0.011)				(0.013)
Upper Mid. Class		0.106***				0.049***
		(0.011)				(0.012)
Mid.-Class Service		0.053***				0.034**
		(0.010)				(0.011)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.107***				0.061***
		(0.015)				(0.016)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.035***			0.012***
			(0.003)			(0.003)
Education				0.060***		0.041***
				(0.003)		(0.004)
Party ID	-0.011***	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.027***	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.024***	-0.027***	-0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.007	-0.005	0.022**	0.006	0.007	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
South	-0.112***	-0.101***	-0.100***	-0.100***	-0.112***	-0.092***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.885***	0.833***	0.798***	0.659***	0.911***	0.668***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.026)
N	5232	4752	4831	5243	5254	4383

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E18: The Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (ANES), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.018***					0.009*
	(0.002)					(0.004)
Upper Class		0.138***				0.050**
		(0.013)				(0.019)
Upper Mid. Class		0.103***				0.051**
		(0.015)				(0.019)
Mid.-Class Service		0.064***				0.034^{+}
		(0.016)				(0.019)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.086***				0.036
		(0.018)				(0.022)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.037***			0.016**
			(0.003)			(0.006)
Education				0.056***		0.041***
				(0.003)		(0.007)
Party ID	-0.020***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.019***	-0.023***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Ideology	-0.066***	-0.065***	-0.067***	-0.064***	-0.069***	-0.062***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Age	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.000*	-0.001***	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.020***	0.029**	0.025***	0.020***	0.017**	0.048***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.012)
South	-0.036***	-0.053***	-0.033***	-0.037***	-0.040***	-0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)
White	0.032***	0.014	0.030***	0.026***	0.043***	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Constant	0.996***	0.997***	0.936***	0.810***	1.041***	0.784***
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.040)
N	9897	4458	10770	11168	11290	3078

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E19: The Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (ANES), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.020***					0.010**
	(0.002)					(0.004)
Upper Class		0.133***				0.055**
		(0.014)				(0.021)
Upper Mid. Class		0.095***				0.046*
		(0.017)				(0.021)
Mid.-Class Service		0.050**				0.017
		(0.018)				(0.022)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.085***				0.037
		(0.020)				(0.025)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.037***			0.015*
			(0.003)			(0.007)
Education				0.047***		0.030***
				(0.003)		(0.008)
Party ID	-0.020***	-0.018***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.017***	-0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Ideology	-0.072***	-0.077***	-0.076***	-0.073***	-0.077***	-0.072***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000**	-0.001***	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.030***	0.048***	0.034***	0.031***	0.028***	0.066***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)
South	-0.031***	-0.046***	-0.030***	-0.033***	-0.035***	-0.037**
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Constant	1.051***	1.030***	0.997***	0.902***	1.114***	0.842***
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.044)
N	7228	3603	7944	8245	8337	2459

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E20: The Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (ANES), Nonwhite Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.009*					0.008
	(0.003)					(0.008)
Upper Class		0.163***				0.028
		(0.029)				(0.043)
Upper Mid. Class		0.128***				0.054
		(0.034)				(0.041)
Mid.-Class Service		0.110***				0.085*
		(0.032)				(0.037)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.080^{+}				0.030
		(0.042)				(0.050)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.037***			0.013
			(0.005)			(0.012)
Education				0.075***		0.076***
				(0.005)		(0.014)
Party ID	-0.015***	-0.025***	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.017***	-0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Ideology	-0.050***	-0.027***	-0.047***	-0.043***	-0.047***	-0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Age	-0.000	-0.002***	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Female	-0.005	-0.059*	-0.001	-0.012	-0.011	-0.028
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.026)
South	-0.045***	-0.064**	-0.040***	-0.039***	-0.049***	-0.040
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.025)
Constant	0.928***	0.914***	0.854***	0.660***	0.956***	0.577***
	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.076)
N	2669	855	2826	2923	2953	619

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Class and race policy attitudes, pooled models

Table E21: The Effect of Social Class on Race Policy Attitudes (GSS), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.023***					0.013**
	(0.004)					(0.005)
Upper Class		0.061***				0.029**
		(0.007)				(0.009)
Upper Mid. Class		0.041***				0.020*
		(0.008)				(0.009)
Mid.-Class Service		0.035***				0.022**
		(0.008)				(0.008)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.003				-0.013
		(0.009)				(0.010)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.000			-0.012***
			(0.002)			(0.002)
Education				0.023***		0.023***
				(0.002)		(0.003)
Party ID	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.017***	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.039***	-0.041***	-0.039***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.016**	0.001	0.015**	0.016***	0.015**	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
South	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.039***	-0.044***	-0.039***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.672***	0.702***	0.724***	0.624***	0.724***	0.625***
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.019)
N	11414	10638	10529	11436	11446	9800

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Table E22: The Effect of Social Class on Race Policy Attitudes (ANES), White Respondents Only

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se	(4) b/se	(5) b/se	(6) b/se
Subjective Class	0.011***					0.004
	(0.001)					(0.003)
Upper Class		0.071***				0.019
		(0.008)				(0.013)
Upper Mid. Class		0.026**				-0.007
		(0.010)				(0.014)
Mid.-Class Service		0.033**				0.015
		(0.010)				(0.014)
Mid.-Class Manual		0.012				-0.001
		(0.011)				(0.016)
Working Class (ref.)						
Income			0.000			-0.016***
			(0.002)			(0.004)
Education				0.035***		0.043***
				(0.002)		(0.005)
Party ID	-0.015***	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.017***	-0.014***	-0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.055***	-0.045***	-0.056***	-0.053***	-0.056***	-0.039***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Age	-0.000^{+}	0.000	-0.000	0.000**	-0.000	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.012**	0.016**	0.011**	0.014***	0.012***	0.023**
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)
South	-0.046***	-0.042***	-0.045***	-0.042***	-0.044***	-0.053***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Constant	0.660***	0.596***	0.694***	0.535***	0.691***	0.455***
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.028)
N	18379	7258	20641	21697	21883	4145

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Class and redistribution policy attitudes, over time models

Table E23: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Reducing Inequality Policy Attitudes (GSS), All Respondents

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	-0.066***			
	(0.003)			
Upper Class		-0.107***		
		(0.006)		
Upper Mid. Class		-0.076***		
		(0.006)		
Mid.-Class Service		-0.033***		
		(0.006)		
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.067***		
		(0.007)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			-0.035***	
			(0.001)	
Education				-0.042***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.034***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.035***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.035***	-0.038***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.042***	0.055***	0.034***	0.043***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
South	-0.015***	-0.018***	-0.019***	-0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
White	-0.065***	-0.066***	-0.055***	-0.062***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	1.046***	0.946***	1.006***	1.073***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
N	30863	28833	28184	30955

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Table E24: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Guaranteed Jobs and Income Policy Attitudes (ANES), All Respondents

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	-0.013***			
	(0.001)			
Upper Class		-0.054***		
		(0.008)		
Upper Mid. Class		-0.074***		
		(0.011)		
Mid.-Class Service		-0.032*		
		(0.015)		
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.053***		
		(0.011)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			-0.031***	
			(0.002)	
Education				-0.016***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.046***	-0.038***	-0.045***	-0.046***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.038***	0.053***	0.030***	0.036***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
South	-0.006	-0.008	-0.010**	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
White	-0.106***	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.110***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.862***	0.826***	0.922***	0.898***
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.012)
N	22827	8414	24979	26204

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Class and culture policy attitudes, over time models

Table E25: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (GSS), All Respondents

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.056***			
	(0.002)			
Upper Class		0.174***		
		(0.006)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.121***		
		(0.005)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.062***		
		(0.005)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.114***		
		(0.007)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			0.035***	
			(0.002)	
Education				0.070***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.051***	-0.050***	-0.052***	-0.048***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.001	-0.019***	0.011***	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
South	-0.086***	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.075***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
White	0.081***	0.074***	0.071***	0.068***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.838***	0.898***	0.855***	0.683***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
N	26617	24717	24705	26670

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Table E26: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (ANES), All Respondents

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.018***			
	(0.003)			
Upper Class		0.138***		
		(0.013)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.102***		
		(0.015)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.063***		
		(0.019)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.083***		
		(0.023)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			0.037***	
			(0.003)	
Education				0.056***
				(0.003)
Party ID	-0.020***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.066***	-0.065***	-0.067***	-0.064***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.020***	0.028**	0.025***	0.020***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)
South	-0.035***	-0.053***	-0.033***	-0.037***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White	0.031***	0.014	0.030***	0.026***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.995***	0.998***	0.937***	0.810***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.021)
N	9897	4458	10770	11168

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Class and race policy attitudes, over time models

Table E27: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Race Policy Attitudes (GSS), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.023***			
	(0.004)			
Upper Class		0.061***		
		(0.007)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.042***		
		(0.008)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.034***		
		(0.009)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.002		
		(0.011)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			0.000	
			(0.002)	
Education				0.024***
				(0.003)
Party ID	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.017***	-0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.039***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.016**	0.001	0.014**	0.016***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
South	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.039***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.672***	0.702***	0.723***	0.623***
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)
N	11414	10638	10529	11436

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Table E28: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Race Policy Attitudes (ANES), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.011***			
	(0.001)			
Upper Class		0.071***		
		(0.008)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.025**		
		(0.010)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.031**		
		(0.011)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.012		
		(0.011)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			0.001	
			(0.002)	
Education				0.035***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.015***	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.055***	-0.045***	-0.056***	-0.053***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Age	-0.000^{+}	0.000	-0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.012**	0.016**	0.011**	0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)
South	-0.046***	-0.042***	-0.045***	-0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.660***	0.596***	0.691***	0.536***
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)
N	18379	7258	20641	21697

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Policy attitudes and vote choice, over time models

Table E29: The Over Time Effect of Policy Attitudes on Democratic Vote (GSS), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se
Reduce Ineq.	0.801***		
	(0.243)		
Culture Policy		1.243***	
		(0.214)	
Race Policy			1.315***
			(0.307)
Party ID	-0.921***	-0.892***	-0.948***
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.039)
Ideology	-0.469***	-0.385***	-0.467***
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.055)
Age	-0.004	0.002	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Female	0.032	0.030	-0.167
	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.127)
South	-0.299***	-0.137^{+}	-0.528***
	(0.088)	(0.078)	(0.134)
White	-1.437***	-1.717***	-1.593***
	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.209)
Constant	6.825***	5.631***	6.650***
	(0.293)	(0.284)	(0.426)
N	6492	7819	2942

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the policy attitudes variable included in the model.

Table E30: The Over Time Effect of Policy Attitudes on Democratic Vote (ANES), All Respondents

	(1) b/se	(2) b/se	(3) b/se
Guaranteed Jobs/Inc.	1.395***		
	(0.110)		
Culture Policy		1.455***	
		(0.168)	
Race Policy			1.501***
			(0.165)
Party ID	-0.860***	-0.920***	-0.873***
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Ideology	-0.629***	-0.629***	-0.613***
	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.026)
Age	-0.005*	-0.005^{+}	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.073	-0.156*	-0.044
	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.058)
South	-0.351***	-0.234**	-0.322***
	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.063)
White	-1.076***	-1.295***	-1.075***
	(0.080)	(0.101)	(0.080)
Constant	6.524***	6.737***	6.491***
	(0.244)	(0.272)	(0.250)
N	13324	8279	13707

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the policy attitudes variable included in the model.

Table E31: The Conditional Effect of Policy Attitudes on Democratic Vote by Issue Salience (ANES)

	All Respondents b/se	White Respondents b/se
Guaranteed Jobs/Inc.	1.046***	0.857*
	(0.312)	(0.351)
Culture Policy	1.024***	1.310***
	(0.241)	(0.271)
Race Policy	0.479	0.307
	(0.299)	(0.339)
Party ID	-0.940***	-0.936***
	(0.040)	(0.045)
Ideology	-0.475***	-0.476***
	(0.062)	(0.069)
Age	0.000	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female	-0.088	-0.250^{+}
	(0.136)	(0.148)
South	-0.251^{+}	-0.479**
	(0.150)	(0.169)
White	-0.849***	
	(0.188)	
Redist. Salience	-0.542*	-0.567^{+}
	(0.273)	(0.296)
Culture Salience	-1.798***	-1.257**
	(0.413)	(0.446)
Race Salience	-0.490	-0.142
	(0.476)	(0.548)
Guaranteed Jobs/Inc. × Redist. Salience	1.176*	1.359*
	(0.588)	(0.658)
Culture Policy × Culture Salience	2.228***	1.728**
	(0.560)	(0.599)
Race Policy × Race Salience	1.727	0.335
	(1.157)	(1.395)
Constant	5.413***	4.621***
	(0.475)	(0.485)
N	2736	2234

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients with random intercepts estimated for survey year and standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix F: Supplementary Analyses and Figures

Results from models excluding party identification and ideology as covariates

In this section we consider the possibility that measures of party identification and political ideology should be excluded from our regression models when analyzing the effect of class on policy preferences and vote choice. There are differences in how scholars of American elections and those who study class and voting control for or opt not to control for party affiliation and ideology. On one hand, if we include party and ideology as control variables we may be introducing post-treatment bias. For people who study class cleavages, class position is considered a structural characteristic that causes political attitudes, including ideology and partisanship (Evans 2010).

On the other hand, if class position is not a cause of party identification and ideology, then we would certainly introduce omitted variable bias into our estimates by excluding these variables since party and ideology are correlated with class and are strong predictors of vote choice. This perspective would be supported if party identification and ideology are considered structural (or long-term) characteristics that develop alongside class position. And seminal studies of party identity and political ideology argue that these factors are largely formed through socialization in early childhood and remain mostly stable throughout one's life (Campbell et al. 1960; Feldman and Zaller 1992). A number of studies support this understanding, finding that core political identities are primarily developed through transmission from parents to their children (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Tyler and Iyengar N.d.). Of course, partisanship and ideology do change throughout a lifetime, as an individual's class also can, but these changes tend to be relatively infrequent (Carsey and Layman 2006; Green and Palmquist 1994).

These differing perspectives make it unclear what is the best or most appropriate approach. Given this ambiguity, we also analyze the influence of class on policy attitudes and voting when excluding measures of party identification and ideology. To this end,

we re-run all of the models used to produce Figures 1-6 in the main text, with the only difference being the exclusion of party identification and ideology from the models. The results are presented below in Figures F1-F6. Fortunately, while there are some differences between the models including and not including partisanship and ideology as covariates, the central conclusions of the paper do not rely on these model choices. But there are some differences that we would like to note.

The main difference between the models is that the effects of class on vote choice are relatively more consistent when excluding party and ideology, particularly for the overall average results from the ANES data (Figure F1). The over time results from the models excluding party and ideology are also somewhat more consistent, again mainly for the ANES data (Figure F2). In the end, we view the collective results from the alternative vote choice models as being consistent with those presented in the main text: class is weakly and inconsistently associated with voting.

Turning to the results for our models of class and policy preferences, there are very few differences between the models including and excluding party and ideology. The only result that substantially differs is the effect of income on our measure of race policy preferences when modeling the overall average effects. For the models including party and ideology the effects are not statistically significant (Figure 3), while the estimates are positive and statistically significant for the models excluding party and ideology (Figure F3). For the over time effects of class on redistribution, culture, and race policy views (Figures F4, F5, and F6), some of the estimated coefficients may differ slightly in size. But overall, our conclusion that class position is consistently associated with policy attitudes as expected, on average and over time, is not dependent on the decision to include or exclude party identification and ideology in our models.

Figure F1: Alternative Model Excluding Party Identification and Ideology as Covariates: Effects of Class on Vote Choice, All Years



Note: The estimated effect differences for subjective class, income, and education are based on changing each variable from its 5th percentile value to its 95th percentile value. Since the EGP class categories are modeled as separate dummy variables, we estimate the difference between working class (the reference category) and upper class, as well as the difference between working class and upper middle class. For race the effect represents the difference between nonwhite and white respondents. All differences are based on results from separately modeled class variables. Bars represents 95% confidence intervals.

Figure F2: Alternative Model Excluding Party Identification and Ideology as Covariates: Over Time Effects of Class on Democratic Vote, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election. Depending on when the next survey is conducted by the GSS, the question is asked in either the following year or two years after the election. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question was asked by each survey.

Figure F3: Alternative Model Excluding Party Identification and Ideology as Covariates: Effects of Class on Policy Attitudes, All Years



Note: The estimated effect differences for subjective class, income, and education are based on changing each variable from its 5th percentile value to its 95th percentile value. Since the EGP class categories are modeled as separate dummy variables, we estimate the difference between working class (the reference category) and upper class, as well as the difference between working class and upper middle class. For race the effect represents the difference between nonwhite and white respondents. All differences are based on results from separately modeled class variables. Bars represents 95% confidence intervals.

Figure F4: Alternative Model Excluding Party Identification and Ideology as Covariates: Over Time Effects of Class on Redistribution Policy Attitudes, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy attitudes with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

Figure F5: Alternative Model Excluding Party Identification and Ideology as Covariates: Over Time Effects of Class on Culture Policy Attitudes, All Respondents



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy attitudes with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

Figure F6: Alternative Model Excluding Party Identification and Ideology as Covariates: Over Time Effects of Class on Race Policy Attitudes, White Respondents Only



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy attitudes with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

White only subsamples, over time models

Table F1: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (GSS), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP (1) b/se	EGP (2) b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.095				
	(0.061)				
Upper Class		0.206*	0.217*		
		(0.095)	(0.086)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.007	0.001		
		(0.104)	(0.094)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.142	0.141		
		(0.101)	(0.101)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.133	0.133		
		(0.113)	(0.113)		
Working Class (ref.)					
Income				-0.064*	
				(0.025)	
Education					0.096*
					(0.041)
Party ID	-0.927***	-0.927***	-0.926***	-0.905***	-0.928***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Ideology	-0.484***	-0.506***	-0.506***	-0.506***	-0.483***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003^{+}	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.032	0.002	0.001	0.035	0.029
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.058)
South	-0.352***	-0.327***	-0.326***	-0.352***	-0.334***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Constant	5.362***	5.566***	5.559***	5.851***	5.179***
	(0.238)	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.232)	(0.281)
N	10355	10481	10481	10216	11121

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP (1)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Upper Class and Upper Middle Class. For the *EGP (2)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Middle-Class Service and Middle-Class Manual.

Table F2: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Democratic Vote (ANES), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP (1) b/se	EGP (2) b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.038				
	(0.033)				
Upper Class		0.389*	0.389*		
		(0.178)	(0.178)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.218	0.218		
		(0.207)	(0.207)		
Mid.-Class Service		-0.007	-0.007		
		(0.225)	(0.225)		
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.405	-0.405		
		(0.253)	(0.253)		
Working Class (ref.)					
Income				-0.038	
				(0.047)	
Education					0.115*
					(0.047)
Party ID	-0.873***	-0.909***	-0.909***	-0.876***	-0.881***
	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ideology	-0.705***	-0.710***	-0.710***	-0.711***	-0.700***
	(0.029)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Age	-0.004*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.005**	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.057	-0.214	-0.214	-0.054	-0.049
	(0.062)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.062)	(0.060)
South	-0.502***	-0.506***	-0.506***	-0.514***	-0.512***
	(0.069)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Constant	6.231***	6.692***	6.692***	6.652***	5.897***
	(0.227)	(0.368)	(0.368)	(0.252)	(0.287)
N	10535	2873	2873	10985	11457

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel logistic regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP (1)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Upper Class and Upper Middle Class. For the *EGP (2)* model, random coefficients were estimated for Middle-Class Service and Middle-Class Manual.

Table F3: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Support for Reducing Inequality (GSS), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	-0.074***			
	(0.003)			
Upper Class		-0.115***		
		(0.006)		
Upper Mid. Class		-0.088***		
		(0.007)		
Mid.-Class Service		-0.043***		
		(0.006)		
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.072***		
		(0.008)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			-0.038***	
			(0.002)	
Education				-0.045***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.035***	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.036***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.039***	-0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.046***	0.062***	0.039***	0.047***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
South	-0.016***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	1.022***	0.907***	0.983***	1.048***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
N	24747	23249	22638	24814

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Table F4: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Support for Guaranteed Jobs and Income (ANES), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	-0.012***			
	(0.001)			
Upper Class		-0.043***		
		(0.009)		
Upper Mid. Class		-0.063***		
		(0.012)		
Mid.-Class Service		-0.031*		
		(0.014)		
Mid.-Class Manual		-0.044***		
		(0.012)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			-0.028***	
			(0.002)	
Education				-0.010***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.051***	-0.044***	-0.050***	-0.051***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.035***	0.052***	0.030***	0.035***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
South	-0.010*	-0.008	-0.013**	-0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.769***	0.732***	0.827***	0.778***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.013)
N	17895	6705	19593	20564

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Table F5: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (GSS), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.068***			
	(0.003)			
Upper Class		0.175***		
		(0.006)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.125***		
		(0.005)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.065***		
		(0.006)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.114***		
		(0.007)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			0.036***	
			(0.002)	
Education				0.073***
				(0.002)
Party ID	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ideology	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.060***	-0.056***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.004	-0.023***	0.007*	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
South	-0.079***	-0.074***	-0.074***	-0.067***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.907***	0.990***	0.941***	0.755***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
N	21385	19965	19874	21427

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Table F6: The Over Time Effect of Social Class on Culture Policy Attitudes (ANES), White Respondents Only

	Subjective Class b/se	EGP Class b/se	Income b/se	Education b/se
Subjective Class	0.021***			
	(0.003)			
Upper Class		0.133***		
		(0.014)		
Upper Mid. Class		0.095***		
		(0.017)		
Mid.-Class Service		0.050**		
		(0.019)		
Mid.-Class Manual		0.085***		
		(0.020)		
Working Class (ref.)				
Income			0.037***	
			(0.003)	
Education				0.047***
				(0.003)
Party ID	-0.020***	-0.018***	-0.021***	-0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology	-0.072***	-0.077***	-0.076***	-0.073***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.030***	0.048***	0.034***	0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
South	-0.031***	-0.046***	-0.030***	-0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	1.050***	1.030***	0.997***	0.902***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.024)
N	7228	3603	7944	8245

$^{+}$ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Entries are multilevel linear regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Random intercepts were estimated for survey year with random coefficients estimated by year for the variable indicated in the column title. For the *EGP Class* model, random coefficients were estimated for each class indicator.

Supplementary figures

Figure F7: Over Time Effects of Class on Democratic Vote, Separate Models and Random Coefficient Models Estimates



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category. "Model for each year" estimates are based on separate logistic regression models for each survey year and "Random coef. model" estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Because the GSS and ANES both use split-sample designs in various survey years for some questions we rely on in our analyses, the samples sizes for the individual survey year models can be very small. Therefore, for the "Model for each year" approach we do not report estimates for survey years when fewer than 500 respondents are available. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election. Depending on when the next survey is conducted by the GSS, the question is asked in either the following year or two years after the election. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question was asked by each survey.

Figure F8: Over Time Effects of Class on Democratic Vote, White Only Subsamples



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

Figure F9: Over Time Effects of Class on Redistribution Policy Attitudes, Separate Models and Random Coefficient Models Estimates



Note: All values are estimated coefficients on policy support with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category. "Model for each year" estimates are based on separate OLS regression models for each survey year and "Random coef. model" estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Because the GSS and ANES both use split-sample designs in various survey years for some questions we rely on in our analyses, the samples sizes for the individual survey year models can be very small. Therefore, for the "Model for each year" approach we do not report estimates for survey years when fewer than 500 respondents are available.

Figure F10: Over Time Effects of Class on Culture Policy Attitudes, Separate Models and Random Coefficient Models Estimates



Note: All values are estimated coefficients on policy support with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category. "Model for each year" estimates are based on separate OLS regression models for each survey year and "Random coef. model" estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Because the GSS and ANES both use split-sample designs in various survey years for some questions we rely on in our analyses, the samples sizes for the individual survey year models can be very small. Therefore, for the "Model for each year" approach we do not report estimates for survey years when fewer than 500 respondents are available.

Figure F11: Over Time Effects of Class on Race Policy Attitudes (White Respondents Only), Separate Models and Random Coefficient Models Estimates



Note: All values are estimated coefficients on policy support with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category. "Model for each year" estimates are based on separate OLS regression models for each survey year and "Random coef. model" estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Because the GSS and ANES both use split-sample designs in various survey years for some questions we rely on in our analyses, the samples sizes for the individual survey year models can be very small. Therefore, for the "Model for each year" approach we do not report estimates for survey years when fewer than 500 respondents are available.

Figure F12: Over Time Effects of Class on Redistribution Policy Attitudes, White Only Subsamples



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy support with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

Figure F13: Over Time Effects of Class on Culture Policy Attitudes, White Only Subsamples



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on policy support with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Estimates for upper class and upper middle class are relative to those in the working class, which is the reference category.

Figure F14: Over Time Effects of Policy Attitudes on Democratic Vote, Separate Models and Random Coefficient Models Estimates



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. "Model for each year" estimates are based on separate logistic regression models for each survey year and "Random coef. model" estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. Because the GSS and ANES both use split-sample designs in various survey years for some questions we rely on in our analyses, the samples sizes for the individual survey year models can be very small. Therefore, for the "Model for each year" approach we do not report estimates for survey years when fewer than 500 respondents are available. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election. Depending on when the next survey is conducted by the GSS, the question is asked in either the following year or two years after the election. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question was asked by each survey.

Figure F15: Over Time Effects of Policy Attitudes on Democratic Vote, White Only Subsamples



Note: Values are estimated coefficients on vote choice with bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are based on multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts estimated for survey year and random coefficients estimated by year for each variable. While the ANES asks respondents about vote choice during election years, the GSS asks about candidate choice in the closest fielded survey following each presidential election. Depending on when the next survey is conducted by the GSS, the question is asked in either the following year or two years after the election. See the Appendix for a complete list of survey years when the vote choice question and policy questions were asked by each survey.

Appendix References

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